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Psychiatry has invested its hopes in neuroscience as a path to understanding mental
disorders and developing more effective treatments and ultimately cures. Recently,
the U.S. NIMH has elaborated this vision through a new framework for mental health
research, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC). This framework aims to orient mental
health research toward the discovery of underlying neurobiological and biobehavioral
mechanisms of mental disorders that will eventually lead to deﬁnitive treatments. In this
article we consider the rationale of the RDoC and what it reveals about implicit models
of mental disorders. As an overall framework for understanding mental disorders, RDoC
is impoverished and conceptually ﬂawed. These limitations are not accidental but stem
from disciplinary commitments and interests that are at odds with the larger concerns
of psychiatry. A multilevel, ecosocial approach to biobehavioral systems is needed both to
guide relevant neuroscience research and insure the inclusion of social processes that may
be fundamental contributors to psychopathology and recovery.
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INTRODUCTION
Psychiatry has invested its hopes in neuroscience as a path
to understanding mental disorders and developing more effec-
tive treatments and ultimately cures. Recently, the U.S. NIMH
has elaborated this vision through a new framework for men-
tal health research, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC; Insel,
2013). This framework aims to re-orient mental health research
toward the discovery of underlying neurobiological and biobe-
havioral mechanisms of mental disorders that will eventually
lead to deﬁnitive treatments. Does this strategy make sense?
Will it bear fruit? Are there any reasons to be concerned about
the scope and limits of this type of research program? In this
article we consider the rationale of the RDoC and what it
reveals about implicit models of mental disorders. We argue
that the RDoC presents a useful scheme for advancing current
neurobiological research along established lines. As an over-
all framework for understanding mental disorders, however,
it is impoverished and conceptually ﬂawed. These limitations
are not accidental but stem from disciplinary commitments
and interests that are at odds with the larger concerns of
psychiatry.
WHAT IS A MENTAL DISORDER?
Assessing the strengths and limitations of a comprehensive
research program in psychiatry depends on clarifying the types
of problems or conditions that psychiatry aims (or is mandated)
to understand and treat. If psychiatry is the medical discipline or
helping profession concerned with mental disorders, circumscrib-
ing the boundaries of psychiatry depends on having some notion
of what counts as a mental disorder. Unfortunately, efforts to do
this have foundered on the great diversity of problems seen by
psychiatrists as well as the fuzzy borders or boundaries between
health, normal variations, and pathology.
The problems included in current psychiatric nosologies
[Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) and International
Classiﬁcation of Disease (ICD-10)] include a great variety of
afﬂictions that represent very different sorts of problems. This
way of partitioning problems is the result of a 150-year history
in which psychiatry emerged from neurology and the custodial
care of the chronic mentally ill to encompass a much wider
range of conditions that overlap with some of the most com-
mon problems of everyday life. No single deﬁnition can capture
this broad and heterogeneous group of problems that includes
many different families of disorders that likely will turn out
to involve very different underlying mechanisms. The common
element across this diversity is some disturbance in higher or
complex functions of thinking, feeling, behavior, and experience.
Of course, this begs the question of how to distinguish dis-
turbed or abnormal functioning from normal variations in these
systems.
Normality as a biomedical construct or category may be con-
strued in at least three different ways that rest on different kinds
of knowledge: (i) what is statistically common or average in a
population; (ii) what is part of the adaptive functioning of an
organism in a given ecological environment; and (iii) what is nor-
matively prescribed or expected in a particular social and cultural
context. Applying each of these notions of normality to brain
functioning raises its own epistemological and methodological
difﬁculties. However, all three deﬁnitions are clearly context-
dependent. Moreover, although these different ways of deﬁning
normality may be inter-related (for example, there is some expec-
tation that in a healthy population what is most frequently found
will correspond to what is most adaptive), in general, these forms
of normality need not be in register with each other.
A basic issue raised by efforts to deﬁne mental disorders
concerns establishing the boundaries between normality and
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pathology (Cooper and Sartorius, 2013). Categorical schemes
tend to treat this as a binary or dichotomous determination: a
person either has or does not have (any or a speciﬁc) mental
disorder. Normality can then be deﬁned simply as the absence
of any pathology. Yet many symptoms exist on a spectrum or
continuum from mild expressions that might be viewed as vari-
ants of normality through to severe symptoms associated with
impairment. While it is possible to measure impairment in broad
terms across domains of everyday activity or social role function-
ing, different types of mental health problems may differentially
affect speciﬁc aspects of functioning and particular domains of
life. Hence, global ratings of functioning cannot adequately cap-
ture what counts as a mental health problem. Moreover, it is
precisely the difﬁculty in coping with symptoms or problems
(e.g., chronic pain, anxiety, or dysphoric mood) that may make
them into disabling conditions for which people seek clinical
help.
In an effort to clarify the boundaries of what counts as a
mental disorder, Wakeﬁeld (1992, 2007) has argued that we can
distinguish the normative part of the general notion of dis-
order, which depends on social norms and judgments, from
the functional part which reﬂects some deviation or distur-
bance of the usual (i.e., intended, designed, healthy) func-
tioning of a system. However, many critics have pointed out
the difﬁculty in deﬁning function completely free of social
context and norms so that in most cases Wakeﬁeld’s disar-
ticulation fails (Lilienfeld and Marino, 1995; Kirmayer and
Young, 1999; Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000). The ways we
use our brains and the kinds of functions we need to adapt
to a particular environment depend on speciﬁc social and
cultural contexts, histories, and developmental trajectories.
Hence, values are woven into our efforts to deﬁne adaptive
functions.
We can learn something useful from the difﬁculty deﬁn-
ing mental health and illness in abstract, global terms: mental
disorders, both individually and in the aggregate, depend in fun-
damental ways on meaning and social context. This reﬂects not
only the dynamics of problem recognition, labeling, and social
response but something intrinsic to the sorts of problems we view
as psychological or psychiatric. Mental functioning in health and
in illness involves inhabiting, adapting, and responding to the
demands of local social worlds. This has implications for any
approach to neuroscience in psychiatry that aims to be clinically
relevant.
THE DSM AS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN PSYCHIATRIC
RESEARCH
Although the ICD-10 is the ofﬁcial nosology globally authorized
by treaties, the DSM of theAmerican Psychiatric Association is the
dominant diagnostic system in North America and has become a
de facto standard internationally in part because it includes useful
accompanying text but especially because it has played a dominant
role in training and research. For over 30 years, the DSM system
has shaped not only the practice of psychiatry but also the research
enterprise. Most studies funded by NIMH and other agencies have
been framed in terms of discrete diagnostic groups deﬁned by the
DSM.
While earlier versions of U.S. psychiatric nosology were
underwritten by psychoanalysis, DSM-III ushered in an era of
operationalizing diagnostic categories through speciﬁc symptom
criteria (Wilson, 1993). DSM-III was driven by a medical model
that saw psychiatric disorders as closely analogous to physical
diseases. The approach promoted by Eli Robins and colleagues
at Washington University in St. Louis emphasized characteristics
they believed would identify discrete psychiatric disorders or dis-
eases, including: (1) consistent clinical descriptions of syndromes
based on symptoms, signs, and behaviors; (2) laboratory tests
consistently associated with the syndrome; (3) family aggrega-
tion; (4) relationship to course and outcome; and (5) speciﬁcity,
that is ability to distinguish different types of problems (Robins
and Guze, 1970; Goodwin and Guze, 1974). This methodologi-
cal strategy was underwritten by a kind of biological essentialism
that assumed that psychiatric disorders would turn out to be
discrete biological entities, each with its own distinctive causes
and pathophysiological mechanisms. The criterion of family
aggregation, for example, was based on the assumption that
genetic factors play an important role in psychiatric disorders—
though family aggregation could occur for other reasons related
to shared environment (Kendler, 2006), family interaction, and
learning history, or even a shared narrative that inﬂuences fam-
ily members’ expectations and styles of coping (Fivush et al.,
2011).
In addition to aligning psychiatry with the rest of medicine,
there was the hope that distinctions could be made between disor-
ders that had implications for differential therapeutics; speciﬁcally,
the recognition of differences in symptoms and course between
schizophrenia andmanic depressive (bipolar) disorder whichwere
important for prognosis, became still more important because of
differential treatment (e.g., neuroleptics versus lithium). Thus,
ﬁndings in psychopharmacology gave credibility and urgency
to efforts to distinguish discrete groups of mental disorders.
The results of the US/UK study showing that bipolar disor-
der was under-diagnosed in the US in favor of schizophrenia
became an important impetus to reform diagnostic practices
(Cooper et al., 1972). The success of antidepressant medications
in treating major depressive disorder warranted its consistent
recognition and diagnosis, which was sometimes obscured by
psychodynamic approaches that focused on cross-cutting per-
sonality traits, character structure, and defense mechanisms
(Klerman, 1990; Strand, 2011). The conviction that DSM-III was
on the right track rested on these few important examples of
differential diagnosis associated with differential prognosis and
therapeutics.
Over time, however, the expected reﬁnements of DSM-III
did not materialize. Syndromes proved to be much less discrete
than intended, with very high rates of co-occurrence or “comor-
bidity.” This was interpreted as evidence of a failure to deﬁne
discrete disorders, although this comorbidity may reﬂect not sim-
ply overlap in the symptoms used to deﬁne disorders, or the
misfortune of a person struck by two disorders (certainly a possi-
bility for disorders with high prevalence rates), but the existence of
causal mechanisms that link one disorder to another through spe-
ciﬁc symptom-related processes (e.g., prolonged anxiety causing
depression; Borsboom et al., 2011).
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Potential laboratory tests emerged but lacked the necessary
speciﬁcity and sensitivity. There was a shift from surface, “pheno-
typic”characteristics to a search for“endophenotypes,”underlying
physiological expressions of pathology that could be measured
through biomarkers (Kendler and Neale, 2010; Kapur et al., 2012).
The search for biomarkers that would uniquely characterize spe-
ciﬁc disorders yielded interesting ﬁndings but none had sufﬁcient
speciﬁcity for clinical use. In particular, the search for discrete
genetic characteristics has turned up a great many genes with
some association to psychiatric disorders but, in most cases,
these are neither necessary nor sufﬁcient causes of any particu-
lar symptom or disorder. Instead, it appears that many genetic
variations make multiple, small, cumulative contributions to risk
for many different types of disorder. Moreover, recognition of
the complexity of the dynamic regulation of the genome over the
lifespan has given rise to new ﬁelds of epigenomics and develop-
mental systems theory (Champagne, 2010; Zhang and Meaney,
2010).
Treatments also have proved to have far less speciﬁcity than
originally thought (Healy, 1997, 2004; Paris and Phillips, 2013).
Antidepressants work for panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive
disorder, and many other conditions. Neuroleptics work for
psychotic symptoms of many origins and increasingly have
been employed as mood stabilizers and augmenting agents
for various non-psychotic conditions (e.g., OCD). To some
extent, this wide use follows marketing efforts by pharma-
ceutical companies to extend (and over-extend) medications
to new conditions, but it also suggests that the therapeutic
efﬁcacy of medications reﬂects their effects on common path-
ways or systems involved in symptom production not neces-
sarily involved in mechanisms speciﬁc to particular forms of
psychopathology.
DSM-III provided a much-needed increase in the clarity with
which clinicians communicated and precision in diagnostic deﬁ-
nitions. Much of this clarity and precision, however, was achieved
by adopting symptomcriteria, thresholds, and exclusion ruleswith
“pseudo-precision” (e.g., including speciﬁc numbers or duration
of symptoms in criteria based on limited studies). The DSM has
been a serviceable tool for psychiatric assessment in those areas
where diagnosis is reliably linked to prognosis and treatment. At
the same time, there has been growing concern that reliability (that
is consistent application of criteria) was bought at the price of
validity (correspondence with distinct forms of clinically relevant
psychopathology).
The DSM has also exerted a profound effect on psychiatric
research because studies funded by the U.S. NIMH and other
major funding bodies have often been framed in terms of its
diagnostic entities. To the extent that the use of DSM diagnos-
tic categories has been a requirement, whether explicitly built into
funding programs or as part of tacit ways of thinking, research
has contributed to a process of reiﬁcation in which the accrual of
evidence about the constructs makes them seem more solid and
natural, if not inevitable, and impedes the development of new
constructs (Hyman, 2010).
As time went on, it became apparent that the categories of
DSM-III were not related in any simple way to underlying neuro-
physiologicalmechanisms. As a result, researchprogress in reﬁning
the diagnostic symptom was slow and DSM-IV was a relatively
conservative revision and DSM-IV-TR mainly a matter of minor
revisions to the text.
THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF DSM-5
Preliminary work on DSM-5 began in the late 1990s and there was
initial hope that the DSM-5 would usher in a nosology driven by
neuroscience (Hyman, 2007; Paris and Phillips, 2013). A series of
research planning workshops was held to set out a broad agenda
(Kupfer et al., 2002). A subsequent set of meetings summarized
available evidence across diagnostic domains. Much considera-
tion was given to the introduction of dimensional rather than
categorical schemes as reﬂecting the reality that many symptoms
occurred along a continuum, which together formed a multidi-
mensional space in which various clusters of problems could be
located (Helzer et al., 2008). Dimensions were supported by sub-
stantial psychometric evidence in several cases (e.g., personality
traits that might underlie personality disorders). The dimensional
approach was touted as better reﬂecting biological reality. In some
cases, there was sufﬁcient research evidence from animal models
and human functional brain imaging to speak in terms of speciﬁc
brain circuitry. For example, a meeting was held on stress-related
syndromes and fear circuitry pointing toward a reorganization of
anxiety and trauma-related disorders (Andrews, 2009; Simpson,
2012).
However, when the time came to formulate the revised diagnos-
tic system, the scientiﬁc evidence proved insufﬁcient to guide and
justify major changes. In some cases, vested interests (in terms of
theoretical schools or the exigencies of clinical practice) trumped
scientiﬁc evidence. More generally, practical clinical considera-
tions were raised against a dimensional approach to diagnosis,
which was viewed as unwieldy and as simply deferring the neces-
sary decisions (label or not, treat or not). As a result, DSM-5 was
a fairly conservative revision (Regier et al., 2013). Even in the area
of personality disorders, where there was strong evidence from
psychometric research for the value of a dimensional approach,
the decision was ultimately to retain a categorical scheme sim-
ilar to that of DSM-IV (Livesley, 2013). Much disappointment
has been expressed with the outcome and there is a sense of
deﬂation and skepticism about the whole enterprise (Paris and
Phillips, 2013; Whooley, 2014). Ironically, one of the more inno-
vative aspects of DSM-5 concerns the introduction of a cultural
formulation interview designed to contextualize diagnosis (Lewis-
Fernández et al., 2014), but this does not directly address the issue
of putting the structure of the nosology and its categories on a
ﬁrmer footing by grounding it in evidence about etiology and
mechanism.
ENTER THE RDoC: RE-ORDERING PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH IN
THE U.S.
In terms of basic science research, one critique of the DSM cen-
ters on the failure to ﬁnd distinct neurobiological correlates for
most disorders. This has been interpreted as a failure to adequately
deﬁne the phenotype; that is, theDSM is accused of creating overly
heterogeneous or spurious categories that do not have single, sim-
ple neurobiological mechanisms; hence, the search for underlying
mechanisms is futile. Of course, it is possible that the existing
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categories have some validity (e.g., at the level of patient’s experi-
ence, predictions of prognosis, differential therapeutics) but that
the pathways from etiology, through mechanism to symptoms
are complex, multifactorial, and do not admit a neurobiolog-
ical explanation in terms of a small number of causal factors
and mechanisms. Decomposing the diagnostic categories into
underlying mechanisms and re-constituting a nosology based on
identiﬁable interactions among component systems might result
in diagnostic constructs with greater coherence and utility. How-
ever, if complex interactions among multiple systems give rise
to psychopathology, it will be difﬁcult or impossible to assign
unique causality to any single mechanism (Mitchell, 2009). Nosol-
ogy would then have to reﬂect not the component systems but
emergent patterns of interaction among them. Moreover, the fact
thatmost current diagnostic categories are heterogeneousmay not
reﬂect limitations in the nosology but the intrinsic complexity of
mechanisms of psychopathology, in which theremay be ﬁnal com-
mon pathways of symptom production and experience relevant to
multiple forms of pathology. Moving the search for mechanism
back several steps in the causal chain to putative endopheno-
types may increase the likelihood of ﬁnding certain lower-level
mechanisms but it will not provide a complete explanation of
how most symptoms are produced nor will it adequately address
the role in psychopathology of processes of self-understanding,
coping, and interpersonal communication or interaction with
others.
To advance the search for underlying mechanisms, the U.S.
NIMH has developed its own scheme, the RDoC, and has
parted ways with the APA very publically and polemically (Insel,
2013). In contrast to the clinical orientation of the DSM-5,
the RDoC offers a research framework that relies on functional
domains, deﬁned by preliminary research on brain circuitry
(Insel et al., 2010; Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). In its initial ver-
sion, RDoC includes ﬁve major domains covering negative
valence systems (i.e., those that respond to aversive situations),
positive valence systems, cognitive systems, systems for social
processes, and arousal/regulatory systems. Much like the DSM,
these domains of research were established by roundtable dis-
cussions among leading experts. As such, they represent a
snapshot of current work in neurobiology. The list of domains
and constructs is expected to change and expand with new
research.
The RDoC is a dimensional framework intended to advance
research and produce a new diagnostic system based on biological
measures, particularly neurobiology. The RDoC is presented as
2 × 2 matrix with the rows representing domains and constructs
and the columns units of analysis (Figure 1). The domains group
together constructs that represent behavioral functions for which
there is some knowledge of underlying neurobiological mecha-
nisms. The units of analysis represent the methodological tools,
measures, and levels of analysis currently available for research
on “normal” or adaptive functioning as well as psychopathology.
It is not clear to what extent the two dimensions are indepen-
dent in the sense that the units or levels of analysis are largely
driven by the domains and constructs which, in turn, empha-
size areas where there are currently available models of brain
circuitry.
The primary focus of RDoC is on neural circuitry, with levels
of analysis moving in two directions: upward from physiolog-
ical measures of the circuitry to clinically relevant behaviors
and self-reports, and downward to the genetic and molecu-
lar/cellular processes that underlie the structure and function
of brain circuits. A core assumption of RDoC is that men-
tal disorders are brain disorders, speciﬁcally disorders of brain
circuits and that dysfunction of these circuits can be identi-
ﬁed with the tools of neuroscience (electrophysiology, functional
imaging, connectomics), which will lead to etiological mod-
els of mental disorders and to curative treatments that directly
target these mechanisms (Insel, 2013). Although this may be
a long-term goal, the framers of RDoC believe that heavy
investment in this program is warranted since research strate-
gies with more immediate return will not lead to curative
treatments but merely stop-gap methods of managing symp-
toms.
DILEMMAS OF THE RDoC FRAMEWORK
The virtues of the RDoC approach are related to its breaking
away from the rigid diagnostic categories of existing psychi-
atric nosology and include: (1) an emphasis on the potential
continuity or links between “normal” adaptive functioning and
psychopathology; (2) a focus on potential mechanisms for psy-
chopathology that builds on existing experimental paradigms
(especially animal models that allow a wide range of invasive
experimental techniques to examine neural circuitry, cellular,
and molecular machinery); and (3) a commitment to remain
open to new dimensions, constructs, and levels of analysis.
In particular, the RDoC architects recognize the importance
of the temporal dimension, particularly in terms of develop-
mental trajectories and processes of gene–environment interac-
tion, including epigenetics (Cuthbert, 2014, p. 30). They also
acknowledge the importance of the environment, although this
is discussed mainly in terms of the inﬂuence of physical circum-
stances or discrete events like childhood trauma on biological
processes.
Despite the potential value of its approach, there are many
criticisms of and concerns about RDoC as a comprehensive frame-
work for guiding research on mental health problems. Here we
will focus on three broad sets of problems with RDoC: (1) the
limitations of approaching pathology through “normal” mech-
anisms; (2) the privileging of the level of neural circuitry and
comparative lack of attention to levels of explanation that would
include social, interpersonal, and other processes; and (3) the rel-
ative lack of attention to phenomenology, narrativity, and lived
experience.
THE NORMAL AND THE PATHOLOGICAL
The Research Domain Criteria assumes that dysfunction can be
best understood against the backdrop of normal functioning
and frames this in terms of a set of questions: “What is the
normal distribution for a certain trait or characteristic; what
is the brain system that primarily implements this function;
and, how can we understand, at various levels of mechanism,
what accounts for the development of dysregulation or dysfunc-
tion in these systems along normal-to-abnormal dimensions?”
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FIGURE 1 |The NIMH RDoC framework organized as a 2 × 2 matrix
with rows for broad biobehavioral domains that group together
specific constructs and columns representing levels of analysis, units,
or types of data. Neural circuitry is the central level of analysis on the
assumption that behavioral and experiential manifestations of
psychopathology can be traced to underlying circuitry which, in turn, can
be analyzed in terms of cellular, molecular, and genetic mechanisms.
Rows may be further subdivided in terms of speciﬁc constructs.
A column is reserved for experimental paradigms, which may be
speciﬁc to domains.
(Cuthbert, 2014, p. 31). Understanding psychopathology in terms
of variations of normality has many merits. An understand-
ing of normal functioning may prevent pathologizing ordinary
variations and point to how usually adaptive processes may
become part of vicious circles that result in pathology. Inter-
preting the results of brain imaging or other neurobiological
measures depends on having a clear sense of how these struc-
tures and processes usually function. Of course, this begs the
question of how one establishes norms. Identifying dysfunction
or dysregulation of a functional system requires assumptions
about normal functioning that are not independent of con-
text. Although the examples of psychopathology targeted by
proponents of RDoC tend to be major neuropsychiatric dis-
orders that have similar symptomatology across cultures and
contexts, most psychiatric disorders show substantial individual,
cultural, and contextual variation (Gone and Kirmayer, 2010).
In choosing to focus on disorders that show less variation or
that have animal models, RDoC-driven research would inevitably
set aside many of the most common mental health problems.
While norms might be deﬁned against adaptive niches and phys-
iological parameters in animals, they will generally have to be
recalibrated and reconsidered to reﬂect human functioning in
speciﬁc environmental, social, and cultural contexts that vary
widely.
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Ironically, the road to pathology via normality creates its own
problem of heterogeneity. To illustrate how RDoC would encour-
age cross-cutting measurements of circuitry, Cuthbert suggests
that “samples for a study of reward circuit activity (as relevant
to anhedonia and/or mania) might be drawn from virtually the
entire population of treatment- seeking adults – mood/anxiety
spectrum, psychotic spectrum, eating disorders, personality dis-
orders; for appropriate exploration of dimensionality, the sample
would also include relatively minor psychopathology such as an
adjustment reaction diagnosis as well as those individuals who
do not meet criteria for any diagnosis” (Cuthbert, 2014, p. 32).
After critiquing the DSM for creating heterogeneous categories
that do not map onto discrete neurocircuitry, it seems inconsis-
tent if not incoherent to emphasize looking for dysfunction across
such disparate phenotypes. The assumption seems to be that the
underlying mood-regulation circuits do much the same thing no
matter what the neural and behavioral contexts within which they
operate. In terms of the context of the brain, insofar as circuits are
inﬂuenced (perhaps even reorganized) by their input from other
neural processes, or the larger circuits in which they are embed-
ded, this hope may be unfounded. In terms of the larger context of
adaptation, individuals with particular types of psychopathology
and social predicaments, may have to use their brains differently
to adapt and this could lead to very different patterns of activity
in circuits.
The focus on normality also may ignore the unique qualities of
pathology (David, 2010). There is a long tradition in the philoso-
phy of biology and medicine, arguing that pathology has its own
characteristics and requires its own methods of study (Canguil-
hem, 1989; Tiles, 1993). The clinico-pathological method collects
cases that exemplify extreme forms of disorders in order to under-
stand their characteristics. The assumption is that pathology may
have its own unique features and, moreover, that the mechanisms
of “breakdown” may sometimes be easier to discern than those of
normal functioning. If this method has failed so far to yield spe-
ciﬁc neurobiological correlates for most psychiatric disorders, it
may be because the alterations in functional systems are subtler or
reﬂect the interaction of multiple systems that subserve complex
behavior (Mitchell, 2009).
If pathology has its own unique characteristics that are not
simply the extreme end of statistically deﬁned normality, the
search for mechanisms of psychopathology cannot be limited
to the study of “normal” systems because the ways that neu-
ral systems break down may reﬂect the dynamics of pathology,
including distinctive changes in structure and function as well
as the ways that various pathogenic agents challenge, perturb,
and disrupt neural circuitry and processes. The dynamics of
pathology may include various states of neural systems that
are not active ordinarily but reached only through patholog-
ical developmental trajectories or histories of learning. Even
the effects of pathogenic physical factors agent may involve
distinctive physiological derangements; e.g., toxins, mutations,
injuries, infectious agents all have their own characteristics and
dynamics distinct from those of the adaptive system. As a
result, as has long been recognized in medicine, pathology is
a study in its own right. However limited our current models
of adaptive processes, side-stepping or postponing the study of
pathology by focusing primarily on normal functioning is going
to limit or delay understanding the mechanisms of illness and
disease.
THE SEARCH FOR ENDOPHENOTYPES AND BIOSIGNATURES
In place of a focus on examining psychopathology, the RDoC
program adopts a “translational research”approach in which well-
studied neurobiological mechanisms of normal functioning are
translated into clinical models and interventions (Casey et al.,
2013; Insel and Landis, 2013). The conviction is that data from
genetic and clinical neuroscience will yield “biosignatures” (the
language implies something more speciﬁc than a biomarker, the
biological equivalent of a pathognomonic sign) that can com-
plement, augment and, in some cases, ultimately replace clinical
diagnoses based on symptoms and signs. Of course, this approach
cannot completely set aside the phenomenological categories and
social predicaments that are the focus of clinical work. Clinical
work involves translation back and forth from one framework
(neurobiology) to another (clinical presentations) that is artic-
ulated in terms of behavior and experience. If endophenotypes
replace behavior and experience, we may end up with a situa-
tion in which the biologically deﬁned parameters are assessed and
treated while the patient is asked to stand to one side. The RDoC
model is that of physical medicine, where a clinician may diagnose
and attempt to treat diabetes regardless of the patient’s recognition
and understanding of the disease. Of course, effective treatment
requires the patient’s engagement and active collaboration but the
focus of technical expertise in biomedicine tends to be on the
disease rather than the person. Indeed, this tendency to displace
the person by the disease is precisely what many have critiqued
in current biomedicine. The remedy on offer of more research on
neurobiologicalmechanismsdoes not contribute directly to efforts
to develop a person-centered medicine (Mezzich et al., 2010) – as
distinct from a personalized medicine that focuses on tailoring
treatment to individuals’ biological differences – and, if pursued
to the exclusion of other levels of explanation that include indi-
viduals’ illness experience and lifeworlds, will work against efforts
to humanize care.
By focusing on constructs with established neurobiology, the
RDoC matrix assumes that existing research areas are a good
place to start the discovery process. Mining at the exposed
coal face makes sense in terms of immediate productivity (and
support for established researchers with productive paradigms)
but it is an investment in “normal science” and, depending
on how it is deployed in research programs, may discour-
age more exploratory studies aimed at developing entirely new
constructs.
Although current brain research methods have important
limitations, they are undergoing constant reﬁnement. For exam-
ple, much of the neurobiological research supporting the RDoC
includes fMRI studies, which often yield inconsistent and ten-
uous ﬁndings (Vul et al., 2009; Ramsey et al., 2010; Todd et al.,
2013). Current techniques lack sufﬁcient temporal and anatom-
ical resolution to answer ﬁne-grained questions about process.
Further, the differences in blood ﬂow and metabolism measured
in functional MRI need not have a simple correspondence to spe-
ciﬁc neural functioning (Shulman, 2013). As a body of work is
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built up mapping function onto speciﬁc pathways, new studies
will be easier to interpret and will yield new insights. Ultimately,
however, the problems with fMRI research may not be just the
technical limitations of the method but the assumptions that
guide the formulation of research questions and hypotheses: it
is possible that psychopathology does not lie in functional spe-
ciﬁc neural processes alone; rather, psychopathology may arise
from larger system dynamics (Kirmayer and Gold, 2012). The
brain adapts to a social world and its modes of function and
dysfunction can best be understood in relation to the oppor-
tunities and demands afforded by speciﬁc social contexts and
positions.
The RDoC scheme assumes that underlying biological mecha-
nisms will be similar across species and individuals. This is framed
as a rejection of “human exceptionalism”: human beings are ani-
mals like any other as reﬂected in “the surprising conservation
of genes, neurotransmitters, and behavioral functions across evo-
lution – even in model animals such as fruit ﬂies and zebraﬁsh”
(Cuthbert, 2014, p. 31). Hence, a rodent model of depression,
autism or schizophrenia can stand in for human psychopathol-
ogy on the assumption that the underlying mechanisms are not
only relatively homogeneous across individuals, populations, and
cultures but also across species. Indeed, there is such conﬁdence
in the universality of mechanisms that one type of study envis-
ages bringing together symptomatically diverse groups of people
to be studied in terms of the same construct. This puts a lot of
faith in the stability or similarity of neural systems functioning in
the context of very different forms of psychopathology. Yet it is
possible that people vary individually and culturally in ways that
not only change some parameters within a given circuit but that
actually alter the functions of that circuit in relation to the larger
organization of behavior. Moreover, it is possible that pathology
itself results in different modes of functioning so that certain pro-
cesses are simply not seen at the mild or “normal” end of the
spectrum. Far from revealing the links between normal function-
ing andpathology, therefore, including awide spectrumof patients
in the same study may obscure the changing meaning of neural
function in the context of speciﬁc types of disorder (Kagan, 2012).
As Weinberger and Goldberg (2014) point out, the way that a
person with autism or schizophrenia responds to the laboratory
setting of an fMRI study may differ markedly from someone with-
out this type of psychopathology, violating a basic assumption of
experimental design and complicating the interpretation of any
observed differences.
Moreover, neural responsesmay vary across individuals accord-
ing to their sociocultural background and the immediate social
context, as well as other factors, like affective state, tacit values,
and intentions which may be mobilized by speciﬁc contextual
cues or task demands (e.g., Kim and Sasaki, 2014; Ma et al.,
2014). Findings from patients with one social background or in
one social context therefore may not be generalizable to popu-
lations with similar symptoms. While symptoms of underlying
disorders may vary across individuals, apparently similar symp-
toms may have different causes, which change their dynamics and
implications for clinical prognosis and treatment. All of these argu-
ments apply not only to overt symptoms but to endophenotypes as
well.
LEVELS OF EXPLANATION: CIRCUITS, SYSTEMS, AND
CONTEXTS
RDoC uses the term “neural circuitry” to describe a level of
analysis but this must be seen as a metaphor for certain kinds
of models of brain functioning, since most current method-
ology only allows indirect measurement of putative underlying
neural circuits. In practice, the circuits currently studied in neu-
roscience vary from detailed description of small networks of
neurons in animals derived from single unit recording, through
anatomical and functional mapping of large white matter tracts
(the “connectome;” Sporns, 2013), to box-and-arrow diagrams
of information processes based on anatomical localization of
activation during speciﬁc tasks. Convergence among these and
other methodologies can clarify the nature of information pro-
cessing in the brain; however, the deﬁnition and meanings of
“circuitry” differ in each of these cases, in terms of the compo-
nents of the circuit, their dynamics, and the associated levels of
processing.
The early versions of neural network theory represented a limit
case of extreme simplicity. The fact that it was possible to con-
struct a universal Turing machine from such simple constituents
(McCulloch and Pitts, 1943) served to show the computational
possibilities and gave impetus to the development of neural net-
work models with greater biological reality. In reality, with over
1000 different types of neurons in the brain and with potential
emergent phenomena of ephaptic transmission and synchronous
ﬁring through local electromagnetic ﬁelds, the nervous system
is immensely more powerful than such simple networks. More
complex networks have their own emergent properties that have
not yet be sufﬁciently considered in the simple box-and-arrow dia-
grams of information processingmodels of cognitive neuroscience
(Alivisatos et al., 2012). Indeed, the boxes or nodes in neural sys-
tems models represent functional modules that integrate multiple
inputs to produce output that participates in larger systems. These
modules have their own dynamics that interact with the larger
system dynamics.
Although circuits are portrayed as discrete, isolable systems
that can be analyzed without reference to any larger system, the
biological reality is that they are nested within larger systems.
The brain as a whole provides a context for individual circuits
or networks that perform multiple functions that can only be
fully understood in terms of the overall system. Hence, the func-
tions of individual circuits may only be understood when they are
viewed in the context of the larger networks in which they par-
ticipate. Beyond the individual brain, the social world provides
contexts that have shaped neural organization and functioning
on multiple timescales. Culture can be seen as providing essen-
tial contexts for the development and functioning of the brain on
multiple timescales: through its evolutionary history, which has
involved brain–culture coevolution; across individual lifespans as
biographical events are inscribed in circuitry by mechanisms of
epigenetics and learning; and through ongoing inﬂuences on neu-
ral functioning by speciﬁc contexts of adaptation and performance
(Krubitzer and Stolzenberg, 2014). The emerging ﬁeld of cultural
neuroscience is showing how the observed differences between
ethnocultural groups in behavior and experience are associated
with corresponding changes in neural functioning in response
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to speciﬁc tasks or contexts (Han et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013;
Kim and Sasaki, 2014). Interpreting these results requires under-
standing the meanings of culture for the individual in terms of
developmental trajectories, social roles, skills, and the expec-
tations, goals, and strategies evoked by a given social context
(Choudhury and Kirmayer, 2009; Seligman et al., in press). While
these social, cultural, and contextual dimensions of behavior and
experience are reﬂected in the architecture and functioning of
the brain, they remain located in the social world in institutions,
discourse, and practices.
Explications of RDoC mention the importance of a third
dimension of time, representing developmental processes and tra-
jectory, and a fourth dimension of environment. Unfortunately,
the developmental and contextual dimensions of RDoC have not
been elaborated to the same extent as the neurobiological con-
structs or levels of analysis. Indeed, close attention to development
and to environmental and social contexts would lead to a differ-
ent set of levels of analysis that encompass interpersonal, social,
and cultural contexts (Kirmayer and Gold, 2012). These levels are
relevant not only to research on social constructs but may provide
novel insights into the nature of biologicalmechanisms. To take an
example close to Insel’s own area of research, the neurohormone
oxytocin, which has been found to be associated with pair bond-
ing and feelings of trust, may not simply activate such prosocial
systems, but make individuals more sensitive to social cues (Bartz
et al., 2011). Characterizing the behavioral effects of oxytocin may
then require a deeper understanding of kinds of social situations
and relationships and the tradeoffs that may occur for individuals
living in communities that are very different in size and struc-
ture than the evolutionary contexts in which the neurohormonal
system originally emerged (Kim and Sasaki, 2014).
Attention to the environment not as physical or material space
but as fundamentally social contexts, situations or predicaments
would encourage consideration of other key constructs and mea-
sures (Kirmayer and Gold, 2012). In turn, this would lead to
novel ways to approach the nature of psychopathology in spe-
ciﬁc domains. Methodologies that are widely used to study social
context, including ethnography and narrative-based research have
no obvious place in the RDoC scheme – presumably because they
are not easily associated with speciﬁc brain circuitry but, perhaps,
also because of a deeper skepticism about the scientiﬁc utility of
studying subjectivity and experience.
NARRATIVE, ACTION, AND EXPERIENCE
A ﬁnal set of issues raised by RDoC arises from the fact that
many complex, experiential aspects of psychopathology cannot
be studied with animal models. By emphasizing animal models
in research, distinctively human processes are sidelined. Central
among these are language and narrativity. The human ability to
construct stories as vehicles for cognition and communication is
important for many aspects of psychological conﬂict, coping, and
healing.
Since the time of Jaspers there has been recognition that illness
experience and clinical presentations reﬂect both neuropathol-
ogy and the patient’s attitude toward the illness (Stanghellini
et al., 2013). Even the most severe forms of psychopathology
owe their experiential and behavioral manifestations not just
to their underlying biology but also to cognitive-interpretive
and interpersonal processes that are at play prior to the onset
of illness, during the genesis of symptoms, and throughout
the course of illness. These processes are not incidental to
psychopathology but intrinsic to its “natural history,” which
is necessarily also a personal and social history, mediated by
meaning-centered processes. Chief among these are the embodied
and enacted processes of metaphor and the linguistic practices of
narrative.
Although patients’ self-descriptions are viewed in current
psychiatry primarily as ways to identify symptoms to assign a diag-
nosis, the metaphors, and narratives that people use to understand
and communicate their experience contribute to the underly-
ing dynamics of illness. Narratives can be causal mechanisms
in human experience (and psychopathology) in several different
ways: (i) by inﬂuencing cognitive processes involved in the reg-
ulation of attention and the interpretation of sensory experience
and perception. For example, attributional processes are central
to symptom experience and guide coping, help-seeking and treat-
ment response (Kirmayer and Bhugra, 2009); (ii) by conﬁguring
the structure of goals, plans or intentions in terms of feedback
loops, with set-points in behavior that constitute plans or goals of
action (Miller et al., 1960; Juarrero, 1999). This builds on an essen-
tial insight of cybernetics that adaptive systems are structured in
terms of regulatory feedback systems (Wiener, 1948/1961; Ashby,
1960; Arbib, 1972; Pickering, 2010), but adds the notion that the
comparator functions or set-points in these systems can be set
up by cognitive processes that are governed by narratives; (iii)
by giving rise to or constraining other narratives. Narratives are
generative and have their own dynamics of coherence and cre-
ativity, reﬂected in processes such as dissonance reduction and
imaginative elaboration (Oatley, 1992). These narrative processes
may be sources of suffering and of adaptation (Lewis, 2011); (iv)
by positioning the person in a social world, communicating and
eliciting speciﬁc responses from others. This is the social action
perspective (Kleinman, 1988); and (v) by leading to or evoking
larger narrative structures and discursive formations in which
others participate – and which reframe and given new meaning
to their actions. These larger social narratives may shape indi-
vidual experience in self-vindicating loops (Hacking, 1999, 2002).
This is an important process in psychiatry because diagnostic con-
structs tend to become part of popular discourse and modes of
self-understanding.
Although many social processes occur through non-verbal
interactions across the lifespan, narrative represents a particu-
lar important bridge between individual psychological processes
and the social world. As such, the study of narrative processes –
both in terms of individual cognition, interpersonal interaction
and wider social/discursive processes – is vital to understanding
key mental health processes including symptom interpretation,
coping, regulation of self-efﬁcacy and self-esteem, and stigma.
EMBODIED BRAINS, ENACTED MINDS: TOWARD SYSTEMS
NEUROSCIENCE FOR PSYCHIATRY
Despite hope for neurobiological explanations for mental disor-
ders, models to date are speculative, with insufﬁcient empirical
support, and do not lead to clear predictions in terms of prognosis
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or treatment, nor, indeed, to a clear nosology dividing one type of
problem from another. Despite intensive search, there are no clin-
ically useful biomarkers for psychopathology. There are various
ways to interpret this failure.
It may be that we simply have too little neurobiological data.
Mental disorders are complex and varied and we need to accu-
mulate much more data until the key variables can be identiﬁed
and the causal patterns emerge. Recent projects that aim to accel-
erate current research by building large datasets partly reﬂect this
assumption but also take advantage of new methods in bioinfor-
matics to search for patterns. Genomics has used whole genome
array studies to search for correlates of psychiatric disorders. This
same method can be extended to endophenotypes with more
success. Moreover, a similar program focused on the human
connectome (white matter tracts and pathways of functional con-
nectivity) may arrive at novel endophenotypes. However, these
approaches still require theoretical models of functional systems
to know which of the many correlations are meaningful in terms
of potential mechanisms and which are random variation or
“noise.”
It might also be that we are collecting the wrong kind of
neurobiological data. We need to look at other levels or areas
than those currently studied. In particular, it might be that the
complexity of mappings from causal processes to phenotypes
involves so many alternate pathways at each level that the cor-
relations become small and hard to detect. If so, then working
out ways to partition problems based on more reﬁned clini-
cal and cross-cultural phenomenology will remain an important
strategy.
Finally, it is possible that there are inherent limitations of the
conceptual project of neurobiological explanation. The search for
mechanisms in the brain makes strong assumptions about how
human behavior and psychopathology emerges that may not be
warranted for every type of problem included within the purview
of psychiatry.
Neuroscience increasingly recognizes that what is going on for
the brain is not only in the brain but also in the body and in
the social world (Walter, 2013). Much recent work in cognitive
science has argued that the mind is “extended,” meaning that it is
embodied, enacted, situated, and distributed in the environment
and, especially, the social world (Varela et al., 1991; Clark and
Chalmers, 1998; Menary, 2010; Rowlands, 2010).
Just as biological processes inﬂuence the brain’s responses,
potentials, and limitations, sociocultural inﬂuences play a large
role in human brain development and processing across the lifes-
pan. Under extreme circumstances, this environmental inﬂuence
can severely constrain subsequent biological development. For
example, infants kept in prolonged social isolation exhibit abnor-
mal brain development and fail to acquire basic motors skills or
language (Hildyard and Wolfe, 2002; Perry, 2002; Lin et al., 2005;
Watts-English et al., 2006; Rees, 2008). The social environment
profoundly inﬂuences epigenetic and endocrine processes (Cole,
2009; Champagne, 2010; Curley et al., 2011) as well as the neural
circuitry involved in psychiatric disorders, including such higher
functions as language (Paulesu et al., 2000) and person percep-
tion (Turner, 2002; Freeman and Ambady, 2014). In each case, a
dynamic interplay between social and biological processes results
in clinical symptoms, impairments in functioning, and persistent
illness or recovery. The interactions of brain and environment
occur on many levels simultaneously. Together, brain, body, and
the social environment formamutually regulatory adaptive system
(Crafa and Nagel, in press).
The brain itself is a complex, hierarchical system in which
layers or levels of sensory, affective, and cognitive processing
acquired over evolutionary history are integrated into ﬂexible
functioning to subserve the adaptive organization of behav-
ior. Although multi-level systemic concepts of the brain have
been proposed in the past, the focus of most neuroscience
in psychiatry has been on the biological mechanics of neural
functioning at synaptic, cellular, and molecular levels. In most
cases, this involves examining linear causal processes by isolat-
ing or abstracting simpler models from the larger systems in
which they are embedded. In so doing, some of the systems
dynamics crucial to understanding psychopathology may be lost
(Henningsen and Kirmayer, 2000).
The theory of cybernetics introduced by Wiener (1948/1961)
emphasized the role of “feedback loops” in the regulation of
behavior. While focused on organism–environment systems, this
approach provides a way to think about the inﬂuence of the social
world on internal (neural or cognitive) processes. Higher cogni-
tive processes, including consciousness, can then be understood as
control mechanisms in human behavior that emerged from and
subsequently inﬂuence evolutionary processes (Bateson, 1972). In
psychiatry, this cybernetic perspective spawned family systems
theory and therapy, which showed how certain mental health
problems emerge vicious circles in interpersonal interaction. This
systems approach has been viewed by many as distant from (or
irrelevant to) the biological nuts and bolts of psychopathology and
the effort to explain drug treatments in terms of speciﬁc molecu-
lar, genetic or neurophysiologicalmechanisms. However, advances
in neural network theory and systems neuroscience point toward
renewed applications of dynamical systems theory and compu-
tational modeling in psychiatry (Montague et al., 2012). These
conceptual frameworks and tools will be essential to make sense
of the large bodies of data generated by neuroscience by enabling
data reduction, pattern recognition, and model testing. Such sys-
tems thinking can also provide new approaches to a psychiatric
nosology grounded in a typology of vicious circles that includes
psychological, interpersonal, andwider social processes (Kirmayer
and Sartorius, 2009).
CONCLUSION: METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND THE
SYSTEMIC VIEW
Clearly, RDoC is a vision of the future. Given the rudimentary
nature of data relating measures of brain function to psy-
chopathology, it may take a long time before clinically useful
tools are produced. Although there are already efforts to apply
its decomposition of domains to a step-wise approach to psy-
chotherapy (e.g., Alexopoulos and Arean, 2014), evidence for
the efﬁcacy of this type of modularized intervention is limited.
Nevertheless, NIMH views RDoC as the beginning of a trans-
formative effort over the next few decades toward implementing
a neuroscience-based psychiatric classiﬁcation and approach to
treatment. To the extent that RDoC stimulates new and creative
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thinking it may be an important step in the evolution of psychi-
atric science. Seen as one component of the NIMH portfolio of
mental health research, RDoC represents an innovative approach
to understanding the nature of psychiatric disorders. If it nar-
rows the research program of NIMH to exclude major avenues
of research, however, there is much cause for concern about its
impact.
RDoC may deﬁne its notion of circuits and other levels and sys-
tems constructs broadly enough to include the kinds of studies that
can capture context sensitivity and non-linear dynamics. Examin-
ing how the RDoC criteria evolve as the program is implemented
is an interesting problem for sociology of science. Analyzing the
intrinsic limitations of the conceptual framework anddetermining
what sorts of paradigms must be included to capture the dynamics
of mental disorders poses an interesting set of questions for the
philosophy of psychiatry (Kirmayer, 2012). It is possible that, even
with very broad deﬁnitions, the RDoC framework imposes con-
straints on the kind of studies likely to be funded that will distort,
limit, anddelay or prevent understanding of essentialmechanisms.
In particular, the RDoC framework would seem to prefer studies
that are: (1) experience-distant, setting aside behavioral and expe-
riential phenotypes for endophenotypes; (2) focus onmechanisms
that cut across disorders or clinical problems and presentations,
rather than those that are intrinsic to speciﬁc types of problems;
and (3) favor explanations in terms of linear causality in circuits
depicted described in terms of anatomical loci linked in box and
arrow ﬂow charts, rather than the distributed networks and reg-
ulatory systems that cannot be anatomically localized and that
have crucial causal links and components outside the individual
person.
In parallel with RDoC, other major initiatives that seek to map
and model the whole brain or large-scale connectivity will offer a
reﬁned anatomical picture that may lend itself to a richer model of
circuitry. But this will require comparable advances in our model-
ing of brain function to make sense of its connectivity. Just as the
human genome project explained much less than was hoped but
provided a toolkit with which to begin to unravel speciﬁc gene–
protein-function correspondences and pointed toward whole new
notions of mechanism, so too the human brain project will likely
provide us not with simple explanations of psychopathology in
terms of single causes but with new tools to explore the interac-
tions of brain and environment. Systems biology and neuroscience
are developing tools to model the emergent dynamics of complex
networks that can help us go beyond the linear causal mod-
els that currently dominate both research and clinical thinking
(Tretter and Gebicke-Haerter, 2009; Alivisatos et al., 2012; Mon-
tague et al., 2012). Crucially, however, these systems approaches
must be applied not only to the isolated circuit, module or brain,
but to the person in ecosocial context.
In sum, a multilevel, systemic approach with expanded con-
sideration of social context would have many beneﬁts both for
guiding the development of a comprehensive research program
and for developing a nosology with greater clinical utility. We
currently have some of the tools needed to implement such
systems-oriented research. Mixed-methods approaches that com-
bine research paradigms can reveal links between social and
biological events. This can be as simple as assessing changes
in a biological parameter in speciﬁc types of salient social sit-
uations (deﬁned in terms of their meaning for the person
and their entourage) or as complex as mapping the systems
dynamics of dyads or families organized by historical narra-
tives, cultural norms, and longstanding relationships as well
as ongoing interaction. In this kind of multilevel research, the
coherence of the paradigm can come from its personal and
social meaning rather than its reducibility to a discrete neural
circuit.
Identifying system dynamics can provide clinicians with new
ways to assess problems in terms of feedback loops with circu-
lar causality (Kirmayer and Sartorius, 2009). These loops may
depend crucially on social contexts, so that we need a nosol-
ogy based not just on neural circuits but on personal and social
predicaments. The choice of level of explanation and interven-
tion then will be based not on the unwarranted assumption
that molecular or circuitry levels are more fundamental but on
pragmatic decisions about where clinical leverage can be found.
Interventions at any level may have impact throughout the hier-
archical system, with causal inﬂuence working both bottom-up
and top-down. From this perspective, it is as meaningful to ask
what changes are wrought in the brain in response to trusting
relationships as it is to ask how a speciﬁc change in amygdala
function inﬂuences social interaction (Phan et al., 2006; Lupien
et al., 2011). The fact that these multilevel inﬂuences work in
both directions means that insight into the nature of healthy
functioning as well as psychopathology is as likely to come from
understanding social and interpersonal dynamics as it is from
looking at brain circuitry. This recognition would move psy-
chiatric theory, research, and practice beyond the search for
discrete biological mechanisms toward understanding and treat-
ing the whole person in the context of family, community, and
lifeworld.
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